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LAW ASKS FOR TRUST
NATHAN S. CHAPMANt
INTRODUCTION*

What does trust have to do with law? Consider the following
assurances given nearly two thousand years apart to the subjects
of very different sovereigns.
For surely I know the plans I have for you, says the LORD, plans
for your welfare and not for harm, to give you a future with
hope.'
I know the good disposition of the ministry towards you . . I

know there is no disposition, either in the King, the ministry, or
the Parliament, to oppress America in any shape.2
Power, and a claim to rule, ask for trust on the part of the
would-be subject. The author of the book of Jeremiah knew this
in the sixth century B.C.E. no less than the British publicist
knew this at the dawn of the American Revolution. Yet this
relationship remains neglected in legal theory.' This Article
explores the relationship between trust and law through a close
reading of the first two chapters of the book of Genesis.

' Executive Director, Stanford Constitutional Law Center. Thanks to Carrie
Adduci, Samuel Bray, Bill Brewbaker, Bethany Chapman, Kenny Ching, Bob
Cochran, Marc DeGirolami, Stanley Hauerwas, John Inazu, Andriana Mavidis,
Michael McConnell, Jeff Powell, and Chaim Saiman.
All scriptural citations are to the New Revised Standard Version.
Jeremiah 29:11.
2 BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
149 (1967) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Letter
from William Strahan to David Hall (Nov. 10, 1768), in Historical Society of
Pennsylvania, Correspondence Between William Strahan and David Hall, 17631777, PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 1886, at 461, 464 (1886) (statement attributed to
a British publicist)).
3 But see Scorr J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 309-13 (2011), discussed further infra
note 85.
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In particular, why
Why Genesis?
Why Scripture?
chapters 1 and 2-the pre-lapsarian Genesis, before tempation,
disobedience, and death have entered the picture? As the
reading offered here suggests, the creation accounts in chapters 1
and 2 present a useful (albeit limited) state of nature for
analyzing law. The text presents many conditions of law-such
as sovereignty, authority, and a command backed by a threat of
punishment-in a concise narrative that allows the reader to
focus on the effect of law on the relationship between ruler and
subject.
To be sure, the nature of the command in Genesis 2 is
troubling. God essentially forbids the man and woman from
obtaining moral knowledge, from obtaining the ability to make
the kind of moral judgments usually reserved for God. What sort
of God is this? Why foreclose from human beings something so
obviously desirable? Genesis 1 and 2 suggest that law-even a
single rule from what appears to be a benevolent rulerinherently asks for trust.
The time is ripe to review Genesis from the perspective of
legal theory. Few legal theorists have considered the early
chapters of Genesis since John Locke,' and his analysis is a bit

' There are a few exceptions, but none of them focus on the connection between
law and trust. See, e.g., PAUL W. KAHN, OUT OF EDEN: ADAM AND EVE AND THE
PROBLEM OF EVIL 112 (2007) (the knowledge of human mortality is the impetus for
evil and love, both of which are possible only because of the will); Elizabeth Mensch,
Cain'sLaw, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 541, 541-43 (2009) (Augustinian exploration of Cain as
the founder of human legal judgment); Geoffrey P. Miller, Logos and Narrative 2
(N.Y. Univ. Sch. Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 10-78, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=1706219 (Hebrew Bible's narrative demonstrates a sophisticated
political theory that has been largely neglected); Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of
Obligation:Genesis 2:4b-3:24 30-31 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-78, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1499339 (Genesis 2 and 3 were
compiled and preserved by a political regime to present several philosophical
justifications for its authority to rule). For one exception providing a critical reading
of Genesis based on the experience of practicing law, see generally ALAN M.
DERSHOWITZ, THE GENESIS OF JUSTICE: TEN STORIES OF BIBLICAL INJUSTICE THAT
LED TO THE TEN COMMANDMENTS AND MODERN MORALITY AND LAW (2000). For a

broad discussion on legal theory and Scripture, see generally MILNER S. BALL,
CALLED BY STORIES: BIBLICAL SAGAS AND THEIR CHALLENGE FOR LAW (2000);
MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD AND THE LAW (1993); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., The Bible,
Positive Law, and the Legal Academy, in 8 THE BIBLE AND THE UNIVERSITY 161,

161-87 (David L. Jeffrey & C. Stephen Evans eds., 2007).
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dated.5 At the same time, however, Genesis has received
renewed scrutiny by political philosophers,' and close readings of
Scripture (though not necessarily of Genesis) have recently been
employed by Christian theologians writing political theory.' And
of course, religious communities continue to rely on Genesis 1
and 2 in their moral and legal reasoning. In addition to adding
to the scholarship on law and trust, this Article hopes to prompt
scholars to reflect further on whether and how to read Scripture
for legal theory.
Based on an imaginative reading of chapters 1 and 2 of the
book of Genesis, this Article contends that law inherently asks
for trust.' The lawmaker cannot be benevolent enough, the

' See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (W.S. Carpenter ed.,
Aldine Press 1975) (1690); Steven Menashi, Cain as His Brother's Keeper: Property
Rights and ChristianDoctrine in Locke's Two Treatises of Government, 42 SETON
HALL L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), aviailable at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfn?abstractlid=1792700.
6 See, e.g., Leon R. Kass, The (Super?)Human Roots of Law and Justice:Lessons
from the Book of Genesis, 53 AM. J. JURIs. 1, 2, 5 (2008) [hereinafter Kass, Lessons
from the Book of Genesis] (noting that the Noahic law in Genesis 9:1-17 is "the first
law for all mankind," and "a law valid for all human beings everywhere exactly on
account of their humanity"). See generally KAHN, supra note 4; LEON R. KASS, THE
BEGINNING OF WISDOM: READING GENESIS (2003); THOMAS L. PANGLE, POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY AND THE GOD OF ABRAHAM (2003); ROBERT D. SACKS, A COMMENTARY
ON THE BOOK OF GENESIS (1990); Leo Strauss, On the Interpretationof Genesis, in 21
L'HOMME 5, 10 (Nicolas Ruwet ed., 1981); Leon R. Kass, A Genealogy of Justice, 102
COMMENTARY 44 (1996).
1 See generally, e.g., FROM IRENAEUS TO GROTIUS: A SOURCEBOOK IN CHRISTIAN
POLITICAL THOUGHT 100-1625 (Oliver O'Donovan & Joan L. O'Donovan eds., 1999);
OLIVER O'DONOVAN, THE DESIRE OF THE NATIONS (1996); OLIVER O'DONOVAN, THE
WAYS OF JUDGMENT (2005) [hereinafter THE WAYS OF JUDGMENT]. In spite of
Augustine's heavy reliance on the first two chapters of Genesis, see generally SAINT
AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD AGAINST THE PAGANS, bks. 12-15 (R.W. Dyson ed.,
R.W. Dyson trans., Cambridge University Press 1998), few contemporary Christian
political theologians, including those who employ close readings of Scripture, give
them much attention. See, e.g., THE WAYS OF JUDGMENT, supra at 66 (Cain's
founding of the first polis is the starting point for the biblical narrative's depiction of
politics).
' Although the relationship between law and trust remains relatively undertheorized, there is a burgeoning social science literature on trust in interpersonal
and institutional relationships, and testing theories of trust in laboratory and field
studies. A number of studies explore the relationship between governments, or
particular governmental institutions, and trust. See generally, e.g., KAREN S. COOK
ET AL., COOPERATION WITHOUT TRUST (2005); RUSSELL SAGE FOUND., DISTRUST
(Russell Hardin ed., 2004) [hereinafter DISTRUST]; RUSSELL SAGE FOUND., WHOM
CAN WE TRUST?: How GROUPS, NETWORKS, AND INSTITUTIONS MAKE TRUST
POSSIBLE (Karen S. Cook et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter WHOM CAN WE TRUST?];
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subject pure enough, the constitutional checks and balances
rigorous enough, nor the law perfect enough to avoid the
questions put to the subject: Do you trust the lawmaker? Should
you interpret the law and its claim on your actions with trust or
distrust? The text of Genesis suggests that the nature of words
and speech leave a gap of knowledge between the lawmaker and
the subject, the sheer fact of a command and power to punish can
appear arbitrary and the lawmaker inevitably lacks some goods
shared by the subjects. Even in a world unmarred by sin, the law
still asks for trust. Indeed, trust may be less a problem in law
than an inherent aspect of a legal relationship.
This Article offers a reading of chapters 1 and 2 of the book
of Genesis, informed by concerns for the social effects of law.9
Part I considers the implications of God's method of creating the
world by speech in the first chapter of Genesis. Part II turns to
God's prohibition against eating the fruit of the tree of the
knowledge of good and evil. The content of the prohibition and
the nature of the threatened penalty suggest that the prohibition
is a rule against disobedience generally, paradigmatic of a
general claim by God to be the ruler. With the creation of the
woman out of the side of the man, the story gains social
RUSSELL SAGE FOUND.,

TRUST AND GOVERNANCE

(Margaret Levi & Valerie

Braithwaite eds., 1998) [hereinafter TRUST AND GOVERNANCE].
' There are innumerable reasons and ways to read Scripture. The approach here
is probably best categorized as literary. See generally, e.g., K.E. GREEN-MCCREIGHT,
AD LiITIERAM: How AUGUSTINE, CALVIN, AND BARTH READ THE "PLAIN SENSE" OF
GENESIS 1-3 (1999). The seeming inconsistencies in the text-for example, the
difference between the creation accounts in chapters 1 and 2-raise interesting and
important questions about the history and origin(s) of the text, but they are not the
focus here. See generally BILL T. ARNOLD, GENESIS 12 (2009); HERMANN GUNKEL,
CREATION AND CHAOS IN THE PRIMEVAL ERA AND THE ESCHATON: A RELIGIOHISTORICAL STUDY OF GENESIS 1 AND REVELATION 12 (K. William Whitney, Jr.
trans., William B. Eerdmans Publ'g Co. 2006) (1895); GERHARD VON RAD, GENESIS:
A COMMENTARY (John H. Marks trans., 1972) (1949); CLAUS WESTERMANN, GENESIS
1-11: A COMMENTARY (John J. Scullion S.J. trans., Ausburg Publ'g House 1984)
(1974).
Nor is this meant to be a full theological reading. See, e.g., Dietrich Bonhoeffer,
Creation and Fall:A Theological Exposition of Genesis 1-3, in CREATION AND FALL
TEMPTATION: TWO BIBLICAL STUDIES (Chr. Kaiser Verlag ed., John C. Fletcher
trans., Macmillian Co. 1965) (1937) [hereinafter Creationand Fall]; 1 JOHN CALVIN,
COMMENTARIES ON THE FIRST BOOK OF MOSES CALLED GENESIS (John King trans.,
Baker Books 2005); SAINT AUGUSTINE, ON GENESIS: A REFUTATION OF THE
MANICHEES; UNFINISHED LITERAL COMMENTARY ON GENESIS; THE LITERAL
MEANING OF GENESIS (Edmund Hill trans., John E. Rotelle ed., New City Press
2002) (c. 388-420 C.E.); JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, THE LONELY MAN OF FAITH

(1992); AVIVAH GOTTLIEB ZORNBERG, GENESIS: THE BEGINNING OF DESIRE (1995).
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complexity with important implications for the role of trust. Part
III considers the intimacy between God and the man suggested
by the creation of the woman. At the same time, the woman
became for the man-and vice versa-a new locus of trust, one
who shared something with him that they did not share with
God-humanity. Part IV explores the implications of this
reading of Genesis for the effects of law on social relationships.
In particular, this Article argues that Genesis suggests that law
always entails a request from the lawmaker to the subject for
trust.
I.

WORDS AND SPEECH, MEANING AND MYSTERY

The first chapter of Genesis tells the story of God's creation
of "the heavens and the earth" in six days.o "[H]umankind,"
"male and female," are created "in the image of God" on the sixth
day, and God rests on the seventh." The narrative shows God's
power displayed in a particular way: God speaks into being all
that is. The second chapter focuses on the creation of the man
and the woman. Humans speak for the first time, naming the
animals that God has created.'2 A comparison of God's speech
and the man's speech highlights the differences between their
respective powers and freedoms.
A.

God's Speech (Genesis 1:1-2:4)
In the beginning when God created the heavens and the
earth, the earth was a formless void and darkness covered the
face of the deep, while a wind from God swept over the face of
the waters. Then God said 'Let there be light'; and there was
light. And God saw that the light was good; and God separated
the light from the darkness. God called the light Day, and the
darkness he called Night. And there was evening and there was
morning, the first day.' 3
The first chapter of Genesis presents a powerful God who
creates through speech all that exists. In classical midrash,
rabbis sometimes referred to God by the name mi sheamar
vehaya haolam, or the One Who spoke and brought the world

'0 Genesis 1:1.

xxId. at 1:27-31, 2:2-3.
12See id. at 2:19-20.
"

Id. at 1:1-5.
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into being.14 God's speech literally acts. The first six days of
creation each begin with God saying, "Let there be...," and
without fail, there is." God's speech creates and shapes the
world. By putting action into God's mouth, as it were, the text
suggests a unique relationship between God's power and God's
speech. A brief reflection on the nature and the limits of words
and speech raises implications for understanding God, creation,
and the social ramifications of law.
Words are the starting point of an analysis of God's speech
because they precede speech. A word is a unit of thought, a label
for a concept. Moreover, a word refers or corresponds to a
specific concept; it signifies this or that and not something else.
By words one divides and subdivides concepts-words order
thought.
Just as a word means something (this and not that) it may
be ambiguous; it may mean this or that (but not something else).
Words gain meaning through syntax. The lawyer's canon is true:
words get their meaning from neighboring words. Sentences
determine a word's meaning as much as the word itself, and
perhaps more. Words are in this way like the proteins in a
strand of DNA; it is the combination of words, the way they are
woven into a sentence or even a paragraph, that give them
meaning.
Words also gain meaning from social context." It is the
Passover meal that gives meaning to Jesus's words "Take, eat;
this is my body."" Otherwise, this would be, as some early critics
of Christianity charged, an invitation to cannibalism. Social
context matters for words in more mundane ways too. "The
blues" might refer to a style of music, melancholy, a hockey team,
or a handful of crayons, all depending on social context. So we
see that words have a meaning; they mean this or that and not
something else. But their meaning is often determined by syntax
and social context.

"Marc

Hirshman, Theology and Modern Exercises in Midrash Literature, in

INTERPRETATION AND ALLEGORY: ANTIQUITY TO THE MODERN PERIOD 110-11 (Jon

Whitman ed., 2003).
15

See Genesis 1:3-26.

" See generally LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY (G.E.M. Anscombe &
G.H. von Wright eds., Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans., J. & J. Harper ed.
1969).
1 Matthew 26:26.
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Speech makes words public. An utterance bears a thought
into a world of listeners-even if the only listener is the speaker.
When another, a listener or an interpreter, gives attention to
speech, the listener or interpreter's thoughts are forever altered.
Those thoughts absorb the other's speech and are different for it.
Similarly, the speaker is affected by her own speech; words
convey a thought and circle back to rest, or to prod the speaker to
reconsider.
Likewise, speech may fail to convey the speaker's intended
meaning, because the language is inherently ambiguous or
because it is misunderstood by the listener. Just as words derive
meaning from social context, they may lose their meaning or
have it blurred by social context. This is communication: back
and forth, question and answer, openness and learning. The
ambiguity of words and speech in social context does not render
communication impossible, but it does make it laborious. There
is always a chance of misunderstanding.
God's speech is paradigmatic. God's words mean this and
not that. Unlike a great deal of human speech, God's speech is
unambiguous because it does what it signifies. Put differently,
because God's words do this or that-and not something else-we
know that they mean this or that. Speech and action unite, and
God's words are given their content by what they do. God speaks
into being this world, the world of the waters above and below,1 8
of the day and the night,'" of "every living creature that moves,"
and not another world.2 0
Given the nature of words, and the fact that God speaks the
world into being, it should come as no surprise that God's speech
that creates does so by a process of "separating" the created order
into different categories.2 1 On the first day, God separates "the
light from the darkness"; 2 2 on the second, the "waters from the
waters ;23 on the third, the waters from "the dry land"2 ' and all
forms of vegetation from one another; 25 on the fourth, the "two

18

Genesis 1:7.

Id. at 1:14-16.
Id. at 1:21.
21 See Strauss, supra note 6, at 9.
22 Genesis 1:4.
19

20

1 Id. at 1:6.
21 Id. at 1:9.
" Id. at 1:11-12.
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great lights" 26 "to separate the day from the night," "for signs and
for seasons and for days and years," "and to separate the light
from the darkness"; 27 on the fifth, "every kind" of bird and water
animal from one another;28 and on the sixth, every kind of earth
animal, and, separately, "humankind," "male and female," "in the
image of God." 29 Chapter 1 shows God dividing creation over and
over by speech. This suits God's method, for speech necessarily
separates an idea from a world of possibilities, to and for a
specific world generated by the speaker. Speaking, in this sense,
is dividing one concept from another. And for God, dividing one
physical thing from another. Thus God articulates creation.
God's speech also demonstrates how words gain meaning
from syntax and social context. "'Let there be light'; and there
was light."30 What does that mean? What is "light"? It is not
whatever the sun produces-the sun is created later in the
narrative." All the text suggests is that light is not-darkness,
and darkness is not-light. We know what light is because we see
it; if we were fully blind, there would be no light to name. This
Article considers more fully the implications of social context for
the meaning-and ambiguity-of God's speech in view of God's
command to the man and woman.
There is another social aspect of God's speech that creates to
consider-one that is crucial for understanding God and the
effects of God's speech on the man and the woman. Speech
expresses only part of the speaker's thoughts. This means that
even when speech is clear on its own terms, understood both in
its syntax and its social context, it may not fully convey the
speaker's mind. The speaker could be speaking in code, for
instance, so that the terms mean one thing on their own, but also
have a secret, private meaning. Or, the speaker could be
engaging in implicature or outright falsehood. Speech is merely
a selection of the speaker's thoughts; it thus manifests the
speaker's freedom to choose what to say, how to say it, and what
not to disclose. A speaker may deliberately conceal certain
thoughts. Or, speech may simply fail to fully express them. The

27

Id. at 1:16.
Id. at 1:14, 18.

2

Id. at 1:21.

26

* Id. at 1:27.
3o

3

Id. at 1:3.

See id. at 1:16.
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listener may never know whether speech has fully explicated the
speaker's mind, and if not, whether the communication's
incompleteness was deliberate or negligent.
What does God's speech reveal about God's thoughts? What
does it hide? As speech has limits, so does creation. Creation is
not presented in Genesis 1 as an emanation from God's mind.
Nor as co-terminus with God or with God's thoughts; it is
coterminus with God's speech and the limits of that speech. The
world that God creates in Genesis 1 is, unlike God, limited, not
only by chronological necessity (it has a beginning) but also by
linguistic necessity, for God creates by words. God speaks and a
world springs into being, as intimate with God as a song to a
singer.
Even as God's speech is manifest in the created order, God's
The God who speaks is by
thought remains a mystery.
implication one who knows, and who shares that knowledge by
making those thoughts manifest. That is, by making manifest
the thoughts that are embodied by speech-not all thoughts.
What God does not say leaves God a mystery. God knows more
than God is telling. What is God's motivation? Why create?
Why this world and not another? Why are humans made in the
image of God? The text is as silent as God.
Perhaps all we can say in response is that God is radically
free.
God has no contraints; God neither lacks power to
accomplish God's goals, nor is restrained by anyone else from
accomplishing them. We cannot say why God does this instead
of that. But, we can speculate. It was inevitable that the man
and woman, created in the image of God, would be left to wonder
about the motives and plans lurking in God's vast unspokenness.
In this way the limits of speech may be the beginning of distrust.
B.

Human Speech (Genesis 2:18-20)
Then the LORD God said, 'It is not good that the man should

be alone; I will make him a helper as his partner.' So out of the
ground the LORD God formed every animal of the field and

32 For the distinctions between the concepts of positive liberty (freedom to direct
oneself) and negative liberty (freedom from restraint), see generally Isaiah Berlin,
Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 155 (1969). But see
Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr., Negative and Positive Freedom, 76 PHILOSOPHICAL REV.
312 (1967) (arguing, against Berlin, that there is really only one concept of freedom).
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every bird of the air, and brought them to the man to see what
he would call them; and whatever the man called each living
creature, that was its name.3 3
Chapters 1 and 2 present somewhat different accounts of
creation. In the first, creation is a six day process culminating
with the creation of humans, male and female-presumably at
the same time-on the sixth day, followed by a day of rest. The
second chapter focuses almost exclusively on creation from the
human perspective. In it, God creates the man "from the dust of
the ground," "breathe[s] into his nostrils the breath of life," and
places the man in a garden with a defined geographical location,
all before forming the woman.3 4 God tells the man "to till and
keep" the garden, and says that he "may freely eat of every tree
of the garden" except one (to which this Article will return
shortly).
After the command comes a remarkable exercise of
cooperation between God and the man that illuminates how the
man has been made "in the image of God," 36 -one of the only
details given about the man in the first chapter. To "make [for
man] a helper as his partner," God forms "every animal of the
field and every bird of the air, and brought them to the man to
see what he would call them."3 ' God gives the man the ability
and the freedom to create names for the animals, and the
freedom to exercise that power by naming them. Thus the full
act of creation is shared: God creates living things out of the
ground and man creates words for them.
God and man have very different roles, of course. God forms
"every animal of the field and every bird of the air" and the man
"call[s]" each of the "living creature[s]" something, and "that was
its name."" God's act is pure knowledge, freedom, and power
acting in unrestrained concert. The man, too, exercises a kind of
knowledge, freedom, and power. In the course of naming each
animal, the man's reason-his intellect, will, and memory 3 work together to analyze the animal, classify it with similar
" Genesis 2:18-19.
" Id. 2:7-8.

37

Id. 2:15-17; see infra Part II.
Id. at 1:26-27.
Id. at 2:18-19.

38

Id. at 2:19.

35

36

*' For this epistemological formula, see SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE TRINITY (John E.
Rotelle ed., Edmund Hill trans., New City Press 1991) (c. 420 C.E.).
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animals, distinguish it from others, and create a word for it.
God, the One Who spoke the world into being, works from word
to object; the man works from object to word.
The man has power appropriate to him. The man's power to
classify and name the animals is a way those created "in the
image of God" are meant to "have dominion over the fish of the
sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that
moves upon the earth."4 0 In the first instance, then, we see that
the man's dominion is exercised in learning about the other
creatures and creating a name for each to distinguish it from the
others. This exploration, analysis, and categorization is the work
of encyclopedists, scientists, and historians.
When God brings the animals to the man "to see what he
would call them,"4 1 God creates space for a kind of freedom that
suits the man as a creature. The text implies that the man may
call the creatures whatever he wants. The man's intellect and
will are free to interact, exploring and examining distinctions
between creatures and their relationship to him. He is free to
create a name that fits each one. God not merely permits, but
engages the man's freedom by parading the animals before him.
And God apparently accepts the man's creativity: "[W]hatever
the man called each living creature, that was its name."42 Just as
God is free to create any world, the man is free to create any
word. He is not limited to a list. He is free not only to choose but
to create options. God thus includes the man's own creativity
and reason in the process of creation. This kind of creative
freedom, a corollary of power, is surely a glimpse of the image of
God.43
The man's freedom, though, is the freedom of a creature. He
can create merely words." He can only recognize distinctions
between the animals; unlike God, he cannot create them. And of
Genesis 1:28 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2:19.
42 Id.
4 See KAHN, supra note 4, at 191 ("Man is an image of God, because he
symbolically reproduces all of creation.... God's speech creates its own truth-and
so does man's. We cannot ask whether a name is true or false. Naming, like creation
itself, is a performative utterance.").
4
In response to Polonius's question, asking him what he was reading, Hamlet
responds "[wiords, words, words." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, PRINCE OF
DENMARK act 2, sc. 2. In the context of the question, Hamlet was acting insane and
also expressing ironically the ultimate futility of words to cure his ails by righting
the wrongs of his kingdom.
40
41
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course his freedom to know is bounded at the outermost by the
created order. He cannot know what he cannot observe. He
observes only creation and God's speech that creates it. This is a
reminder that there is a great deal that God knows-and that the
man knows God knows-that the man does not.
God speaks distinctions into the created order; man's speech
identifies those distinctions. God participates in the created
world through speech; man participates in the metaphysical
world by knowledge. God, apparently all powerful, invites the
man to participate in creation and gives him freedom and power
appropriate to a creature that will cooperate with God. At the
same time, there is a gap in knowledge, freedom, and power.
There is an otherness to God-a holiness-irrespective of
whether God would issue a command to the man and woman.
God is mysteriously knowing, powerful, and free. Can the man
be comfortable in the presence of such a God, even after such a
collaborative effort? Can the man grow complacent in the
presence of such a God? Who knows what God might do next?
Trust is already a necessary part of the man's orientation toward
God, like that of a child toward an adult, but it is not yet the
trust of a subject, who must be created a subject by a command.
II.

FREEDOM AND THE DEMANDS OF LAW

The LORD God took the man and put him in the garden of
Eden to till it and keep it. And the LORD God commanded the
man, 'You may freely eat of every tree of the garden; but of the
tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in
the day that you eat of it you shall die.'4 5
Before God and the man embarked on their cooperative
creativity in quest of a helper for the man, God issues an
ultimatum. This is not God's first command, but it is the first
command backed by a penalty. Earlier, in chapter 1 of Genesis,
God tells both the man and the woman to "Ib]e fruitful and
multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion
over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over
every living thing that moves upon the earth."" It is unclear
whether this is rightly understood as a command to be obeyed, or
* Genesis 2:15-17.

* Id. at 1:28 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Chaim Saiman, Jesus'
Legal Theory-A Rabbinic Reading, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 97, 102 (2007) (this
command has priority in rabbinic tradition).
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a blessing, a sure thing, another act of creation by God through
speech. The text suggests the latter, for immediately after the
blessing or command is the observation that "it was so. God saw
everything that he had made, and indeed, it was very good. And
there was evening and there was morning, the sixth day."" In
any case, the prohibition against eating the fruit differs in one
significant respect (for the purposes of this Article) from the
command to be fruitful: to the former God attaches a penalty for
disobedience, and a stiff one at that."
Since John Austin, a command backed by the threat of a
sovereign has been the paradigmatic expression of law. Legal
positivists have endeavored to fill out this description to include
rules that create possibilities for human freedom (such as
contract law) as well as secondary rules to determine who the
sovereign is, or who has authority to create law.5 0 For the
purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to note that God,
according to the spare facts presented by the text, undeniably
has authority to issue a command; God has spoken all of creation
into being, including the man and the prohibited fruit. And the
command with a prohibition is a rule that, under many theories,
would be in the heartland of a valid law. This highlights one
value of looking to the pre-lapsarian biblical accounts. They
allow the reader to consider the social ramifications of the formal
characteristics of law without being distracted by the contingent
cultural, historical, and institutional facts in which laws are
They thus offer a control room for
inevitably embedded.
analyzing law.
The command and threat are of a piece with God's creative
activities in the first two chapters of Genesis. Here God again
creates by speech that separates: a relationship is created
through a spoken command that divides the man's actions into

Genesis 1:30-31.
a Id. at 2:17 ("but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat,
for in the day that you eat of it you shall die").
49 See, e.g., Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 18
(1967).
6o See generally SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 79-117.
4
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obedience or disobedience."1 Thus, God creates a relationship of
ruler and subject, or at least the terms of a future relationship,
depending on how the man will exercise his freedom.
Not only does the form of the command reinforce God's
intention to create a relationship of ruler and subject, but it's
content does too: the prohibition on obtaining the knowledge of
good and evil amounts to a bald order to "obey me." The
threatened punishment, especially in light of the obvious power
gap between God and the man, also suggests the unavoidability
of the ruler-subject relationship for the man. The breadth of the
command was bound to amplify the difficult questions about
God's motive and purpose raised by the fact of creation. And to
raise new questions about the nature of human freedom-is it
the freedom to die? How meaningful is that?
The prohibition creates a kind of freedom for the man-the
freedom to do either this or that, but not to do neither." Here
law creates a binary choice--obey or disobey-with resulting
freedom for the man in the simplest sense of a freedom to
choose.
One of the options may not be terribly attractive, as

51 God issues the command to the man, before the woman is made (according to
the narrative in chapter 2-recall that the two seem to be made simultaneously in
chapter 1). Whether the command applies to the woman may be a subtext in chapter
3, where the serpent questions the woman, and not the man, about the bounds of the
prohibition and the credibility of God's threat. Genesis 3:1-5. The question is
ultimately settled, however, when God punishes both the man and the woman for
violating the prohibition. See id. 3:16-19, 22-24. Readers through history have
provided a variety of interpretations of the themes of gender and sexuality presented
in chapters 2 and 3 of the book of Genesis. See, e.g., ELAINE PAGELS, ADAM, EVE,
AND THE SERPENT (1988). Recent biblical scholarship has shed light on the role of
women in the Bible and in ancient Israel. For an introduction to this literature, see
WOMEN IN SCRIPTURE: A DICTIONARY OF NAMED AND UNNAMED WOMEN IN THE

HEBREW BIBLE, THE APOCRYPHAL/DEUTEROCANONICAL
TESTAMENT (Carol Meyers et al. eds., 2000).

BOOKS, AND THE NEW

5 As Paul Kahn notes, the human freedom to choose, with the implication that
choice will shape the world, distinguishes the Judeo-Christian theological tradition
from Greek mythology, where, for instance, Oedipus's best efforts were thwarted by
fate. KAHN, supra note 4, at 42 ("In the Judeo-Christian tradition, every action, even
the mythical first act, is the act of a subject, because every action is the product of a
choice between possibilities. Only with the introduction of a free subject can we
speak of 'what might have been.' ").
" See Kass, Lessons from the Book of Genesis, supra note 6, at 7 ("But even
this threat of punishment [the Noahic law] is made in speech, addressing us as
rational beings, free to obey or not, free to choose risking the threatened
punishment.. . . Lawabidingness both presupposes and promotes the possibilities of
self-command and self-restraint."). See also PAGELS, supra note 51, at 74 (unlike
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will become clear, but man's power to choose-his will-remains
unrestrained. Unlike the freedom to create, analyze, classify,
and name, exercised by the man in collaboration with God, which
is limited only by the man's own createdness and the bounds of
the created order, the freedom to disobey inheres in the rulersubject relationship created by -the prohibition. It is a kind of
freedom created by law.
The focus here on the prohibiton and penalty should not
obscure the staggering breadth of freedom given to the man.
Only one thing is prohibited. "You may freely eat of every tree of
the garden," says God, except "the tree of the knowledge of good
and evil."5 4 The man and eventually the woman are invited to
explore and enjoy all of creation, save for one tree. Anyone
familiar with moral philosophy might rightly question what the
allure could possibly be of going from moral blindness to sight.
After the woman's exchange with the serpent in the third
chapter, the text says that she saw that the fruit of the tree was
good to eat and desirable to make one wise. 5 But that was after
a bit of pointed questioning by the serpent about God's
intentions." Until that point, the reader-and more importantly
the man and woman-have no reason to gravitate toward the one
tree made off-limits, and every reason to revel in the pleasures of
a pristine world and the presence of a grand creator. Paradise
indeed.
Yet the content of the prohibition and the finality of the
penalty attached to it invite a ruler-subject relationship. God
commands man not to eat the fruit of a particular kind of tree:
the tree of the "knowledge of good and evil."" It is, effectively, a
command not to acquire the moral knowledge that belongs only
to God. In the Hebrew Scriptures, the phrase refers to God's
knowledge of right and wrong; it is the knowledge necessary to
make an accurate judgment about whether an action has
transgressed God's boundaries, and it is a property unique to

early Christians, Gnostics believed that humans were not free in any sense that
would leave them morally responsible).
* Genesis 2:16-17.
* Id. at 3:6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
* Id. at 3:1-5.
6 Id. at 2:17.
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God."8 Indeed, after the man and woman disobey the command,
God acknowledges that "the man has become like one of us,
knowing good and evil."59
The command does not prohibit what moderns would call
practical reasoning, moral knowledge, or even legal knowledge.
Instead, it prohibits reaching for the ability, the power, to make
the judgment that God would make.6 0 By disobeying the
command, "[lan takes upon himself the responsibility of trying
apart from God to determine whether something is good for
himself or not.

. .

. Rather, man himself declares what is good.

He does what is good in his own eyes rather than what is good in
the eyes of God."61
Disobedience of the command, then, would not only be a
substitution of the man's judgment for God's judgment about
whether or not he ought to eat the fruit, but would represent an
attempt to gain the capacity to substitute his judgment for God's
more generally. The metaphor of the fruit is transparent:
disobedience would be a grab for moral and legal autonomy, a
58 See W. Malcolm Clark, A Legal Background to the Yahwist's Use of "Good and
Evil" in Genesis 2-3, 88 J. BIBLICAL LITERATURE 266, 272 (1969) ("Judgment in the
OT is ultimately a matter for God. Man exercises judgment only as the agent of God
and to distort this judgment means that one is held responsible before God."). See
also NAHUM M. SARNA, THE JPS TORAH COMMENTARY: GENESIS 19 (Jewish Publ'n
Soc'y trans., 1989) (providing Bible passages and commentary) ("In the present
passage, then, it is best to understand 'knowledge of good and bad' as the capacity to
make independent judgments concerning human welfare."). Gerhard von Rad, an
influential Genesis scholar, contended that "the knowledge of good and evil," like
"heaven and earth," is a merismus of two words that represents not only the
extremes, but everything in between them. VON RAD, supra note 9, at 81. On that
understanding, God prohibited all knowledge, not just the knowledge necessary to
make a moral judgment. Id. Clark corrects von Rad's reading by showing that the
"knowledge of good and evil" is used throughout the hebrew scriptures to refer
specifically to the knowledge necessary to make a divine judgment between right
and wrong. See Clark, supra, at 270. Von Rad's interpretation also seems to conflict
with the narrative; immediately after God delivers the prohibition, God begins to
parade animals before the man, who gets knowledge about them and thereby names
them, a story that would make no sense if knowledge in general had been ruled offlimits.
11 Genesis 3:22 (internal quotation marks omitted).
6o But cf O'DONOVAN, supra note 7, at 3-30 (discussing the possibilities and
limits of human judgment being like God's-without addressing the Genesis 2
prohibition on gaining the knowledge of good and evil).
e1 Clark, supra note 58, at 277. See also Creation and Fall, supra note 9, at 6669; DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, God's Love and the Disintegrationof the World, in 6
DIETRICH BONHOEFFER WORKS: ETHICS 229, 302 (Clifford J. Green ed., Reinhard
Krauss et al. trans., 2005) [hereinafter God's Love].
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complete rejection of God's claim to rule. The command amounts
to "obey me." This underscores the command as a claim by God
to rule. In the second chapter God's relationship with the man is
framed by this invitation to be subject to God. Why must the
divine-human relationship also be one of ruler-subject? Why
must God insist on obedience, instead of merely asking for
collaboration? Why restrict humans from moral knowledge?
These questions are sharpened by the penalty attached to
disobedience.
God tells man that "in the day that you eat of [the tree] you
shall die."6 2 The command is an ultimatum. Its finality is at first
glance curious, and may be best framed by the question why God
does not say "on the day you eat of it I will kill you"? Is God
hiding behind the passive voice? Why not take responsibility for
the rule and penalty? How can the God who spoke the entire
world into being, who created the man (along with the rule) not
take responsibility for what would happen to the man if he broke
the rule?
Four possibilities suggest themselves. First, God is avoiding
the blame, simple as that. Second, death is not an arbitrary
punishment for disobeying this command-grasping for the
divine knowledge of good and evil is death, playing the judge is
oblivion. The text does not expound on such an identification,
but one implication is that there is no distinction between the
effect caused by disobedience of a divine command and the
punishment for that disobedience. To use a technical theological
term untechnically, perhaps punishment for disobedience-at
least of this command-is the natural ramification of that course
of action.
Third, the disobedient subject is one who ignores the ruler
altogether. The disobedient man has thus become the ruler, and
to him the lawmaker is no more. In this way, God describes the
punishment for disobedience from the perspective of the lawless.
Because the lawless man has rejected the lawmaker and by
implication the judge, he would experience judgment only as pain
or unpleasantness, not through the lens of a legal relationship.

62

Genesis 2:17 (internal quotation marks omitted).

*' See WALTER BRUEGGEMANN, GENESIS: A BIBLE COMMENTARY FOR TEACHING
AND PRACTICE 48 (1982) (the threat is merely "a candid acknowledgement of a

boundary to [human] life").
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Thus God tells the one who may be lawless that "you will die"
without repeating a claim to rule, a claim that would fall on deaf
ears.
The final possibility, the traditional reading of the text, is
that the passive voice suggests the man's ultimate responsibility
for the ramifications of his freely chosen course of action. All the
effects of exercising that freedom-including and up to the man's
self-destruction-are attributable only to him as a free actor.
The freedom to disobey points to the prior fact of God's rule,
which points to perhaps the most convincing reason why death,
and not some other punishment, would be the result of the man's
disobedience: man cannot live outside of submission to God.' By
reaching for autonomous moral and legal judgment, the man
would be refusing the ruler-subject relationship, and with it, life.
This last reading rightly directs the point of the prohibition
back to human freedom and God's authority to rule, but it does
not answer the questions about God's motives. God remains
powerful and mysterious, even unknowable. And added to
God's inscrutability, as evidenced by the limits of language
and creation, is a prohibition against getting a certain kind
of knowledge that would in some measure close the gap in
knowledge, freedom, and power between God and the man. With
it is the threat-or at least the acknowledgment-of annihilation,
a reminder of the gap of the man's creatureliness and his out-ofdustness. Is God a grudging giver, who always reserves a right
to take it all back? Will God take it all back? Is the man's
freedom a privilege or an inviolable right, and how can he ever
know the difference?
III. A COMMUNITY OF SUBJECTS
So the LORD God caused a deep sleep to fall upon the man, and
he slept; then he took one of his ribs and closed up its place with
flesh. And the rib that the LORD God had taken from the man
he made into a woman and brought her to the man. Then the

" See, e.g., ETHICS, supra note 61, at 300 ("[Human beings] now know
themselves beside and outside of God, which means they now know nothing but
themselves, and God not at all. For they can only know God by knowing God alone.
The knowledge of good and evil is thus disunion with God. Human beings can know
about good and evil only in opposition to God.").
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man said, 'This at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh;
this one shall be called Woman, for out of Man this one was
taken.'65

God and the man's remarkable shared creative activity-one
forming, the other naming the animals--culminates in the
creation of the woman.66 The story suggests that the questions
about God's motives raised by the knowledge and power gap and
the terms of the prohibition do not inexorably lead to distrust.
Though the man does not participate in the creation of the
physical world other than by naming the divisions in it, he shares
intimately in the physical creation of the woman, formed from
part of his own body. 67 The text does not hint at whether the
man consented to the surgery. Yet after an extraordinarily
invasive procedure, the man gives no indication of feeling
violated. It may be fair then to impute to the man a certain
amount of trust in God, with his body and with his life. Indeed,
the text implies a physical intimacy between God, who has
already formed the man with God's own hands and breath, and
the man, who donates (as it were) his rib, so God might likewise
form the woman.
The man's response is unambiguous. His first recorded
words, one imagines them being sighed, are "[tihis at last."o As
with the other living creatures, he names her, but there is a
difference between his exercise of dominion over the animals and
his naming of the woman." Up to this point, the man has had no
proper name, the text referring to him simply as adamah, or
earthy one." It is only by naming the woman that he is able to
name himself. Her name, ishah, is linguistically linked to his,
and vice versa. 3 It is through coming to know the woman that
he has come to know himself. The man's naming of the animals
was perhaps in part a pedagogical exercise to enable him to get to

Genesis 2:21-23.
* Id. at 2:18-22.
65

6

Id. at 2:21-23.

* Id. at 2:23-25.
69 See SARNA, supra note 58, at 21-23.
70 Genesis 2:23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
n Id. at 2:23.

See SARNA, supra note 5&, at 22.
" See id.- at 23.
72

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

540

[Vol. 85:521

know the woman, and himself. Thus all of creation, including the
creation of the man, is complete only with the creation of the
woman.
The creation of the woman entails the creation of a new
relationship of intimacy: humanity, or fleshliness, is shared only
by the man and the woman. The text repeatedly presents the
pair as two strands inseparably woven. The woman is formed
from the man's body; their names are cognates; and "therefore,"
the text notes, "a man leaves his father and his mother and
clings to his wife, and they become one flesh."74 The Hebrew
terms translated as "one flesh" suggest that the man and woman
are plural and singular at once, echoing the account of creation in
the first chapter, wherein "God created humankind in his image,
in the image of God he created them; male and female he created
The Hebrew word translated as "clings" appears
them.""
elewhere in Scripture "to describe human yearning for and
devotion to God"; used here it implies a gravity between the man
and the woman, an irresistable drawing of the two to one
another. In the words of E.E. Cummings, "one's not half two.
It's two are halves of one."7
They share the breath of life and the image of God, and yet
they are "one flesh" quite apart from God. In humanity, in
createdness, they share something with one another that neither
of them shares with God. They stand together on one side of the
gap of knowledge, freedom, and power that distinguishes God
from all of creation. They stand together subject to the
prohibition imposed by God, as subjects of God. And as the
threatened penalty reminds them, they share fleshliness,
physicality, limitation, and "thereness," in a fixed time and place
where they were set by God.
The separation of the new community of flesh from God is
hinted at in the final verse of the second chapter. Just as "a man
leaves his father and mother and clings to his wife," so "the man
and his wife were naked and were not ashamed."78 No longer
Genesis 2:24.
Id. at 1:27. As the medieval rabbi Rashi put it, "God created him first with
two faces, and separated them." ZORNBERG, supra note 9, at 1 (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
76 SARNA, supra note 58, at 23.
7 E. E. CUMMINGS, One's Not Half Two; It's Two Are Halves of One:, in 1 x 1
[ONE TIMES ONE] 16 (George J. Firmage ed., 2002) (1944).
7
7

78 Genesis 2:21.
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merely ishah, the woman is now referred to as the man's wife.
Has the man left his father and mother to cling to the woman?
Why was the man so needy without her? 9 Why was he not whole
in the presence of God? Now that the man is whole, what role is
to be played by God, the One Who spoke the world into being, the
one who issued the ultimatum? Can such a lawmaker be known?
Trusted?
IV. DISTRUST AND THE LAW

The questions left unanswered by the first two chapters of
Genesis suggest that the paradigmatic conditions of a rulersubject relationship under law inherently ask the subject to trust
the ruler. First, God's method of creation-speech-reveals God
to be powerful, but hides much of God's knowledge. God's mind,
especially God's motives for creating and for prohibiting, remains
largely a mystery. God's five- and ten-year plans are opaque.
The mysterious mind of the lawmaker dissolves into the subject's
speculation, and perhaps suspicion."o
Second, the law itself only feeds these questions.8 ' The
command is a prohibition on part of the knowledge that
constitutes the gap between God and man. Why restrict
something inherently desirable, such as moral knowledge? Made
"in the image of God,"82 the humans are prohibited from
becoming "like God."83 Why would a God, who shared dominion
with the man and the task of naming creation, now begrudge
humans sharing in the task of moral and legal judgment? And,
why such a harsh penalty? Why not allow humans to enjoy the
learning, solving, and creating that are constitutive of human
freedom without imposing a binary choice? The question at
bottom, of course, is why does God have to rule?
" For a discussion of the man's need, see KAHN, supra note 4, at 106-12.
so See Roderick M. Kramer, Collective Paranoia:DistrustBetween Social Groups,
in DISTRUST, supra note 8, at 136, 137 ("Distrust and suspicion arise when
individuals attribute such things as lack of credibility to others' claims or
commitments and hostile motives or deceptive intentions to their actions, especially
in situations in which uncertainty or ambiguity is present regarding the cause of
their behavior. Most conceptions of distrust further assume that psychological states
such as fear of exploitation, lack of confidence, and low expectations of reciprocity
are significant correlates of distrust.") (citations omitted).
8" See Kramer, supra note 80, at 152-54 (the impossibility of changing rulers
can give them even greater power over subjects).
82 Genesis 1:27.
' Id. at 3:5.
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Third, and finally, the "one flesh" shared by the man and the
woman but not God has the potential to be another ground for
mistrust. A good shared by subjects exclusive of the ruler invites
suspicion that the ruler will fail to care for that good.' This is
the perennial concern of the political minority, the out-of-power,
the subject. The man and woman's shared humanness serves as
a constant reminder to them that God is fundamentally different,
fundamentally other. What does God know about creatureliness?
Does God need to eat? Does God know what it is like to have
limits, for knowledge to be just beyond reach? To whom is God
responsible? These exclusive goods may engender distrust,
particularly in a legal relationship."
To these three trust-asking aspects of law could be added
another that comes into focus in the third chapter of Genesis:
What is the likelihood of enforcement?
God seems to be
limitlessly powerful, but we have not yet seen God destroy
something. Is God's power a one-way ratchet in the direction of
life? Or perhaps God would be merciful, lacking the desire or the
will to destroy what, up to now, appears to be the crowning
achievement of creation. The question of God's power and God's
will are quickly raised in the third chapter. The serpent tells the
woman that she will not die if she eats the fruit from the tree of
the knowledge of good and evil." Rather, she will become "like
84 The social science literature supports the notion that people often use group
membership as a proxy for trustworthiness and distrust outsiders. See, e.g., James
Habyarimana et al., Coethnicity and Trust, in WHOM CAN WE TRUST?, supra note 8,
at 42, 42 ("people are more likely to trust someone from the same ethnic group");
Kramer, supra note 80, at 138 ("[C]ategorization of individuals into distinct groups
can lead individuals to perceive out-group members as less trustworthy, less honest,
and less cooperative than other members of their own group, even when those group
boundaries are based on arbitrary and transient criteria.").
85 How best to harness political distrust by constitutional design has long been a
theme of republican political theory. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison)
(even in a republic, "[mien of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister
designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the
suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people"); DISTRUST, supra note 8, at
140-48; Philip Pettit, Republican Theory and Political Trust, in TRUST AND
GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 295, 295. Scott Shapiro has recently brought the
American founder's distrust to bear on legal positivism. He argues that law is a
social plan, partly intended to overcome a society's distrust that some members will
fail to properly resolve difficult moral questions. See SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 30913. Whereas Shapiro and republican theorists explore the role of distrust as an input
to legal systems, this Article focuses on distrust as a potential output, or byproduct,
of lawmaking and law.
" Genesis 3:4.
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God, knowing good [from] evil."" Would being "like God" put her
beyond God's power to destroy? Additionaly, God's own response
to the pair's disobedience raises questions: they were punished,
but were they put to death "in the day" of eating the fruit?8
Instead, God subjects them to long lives of pain and hard labor,
to be followed by death.89 Is this a sentence of torture followed by
death, the primeval equivalent of the punishment reserved in
early modern kingdoms for attempted regicide? As the careful
reader will perceive, the questions raised in the pre-temptation
narrative of chapters 1 and 2 are only amplified in chapter 3 as
the serpent gives them voice and the humans put God to the test.
Even before the serpent steals into the garden, however, the
fact of law in an idyllic state of nature, the bare existence of a
claim to rule-even a claim as justified as God's in chapters 1
and 2 of the book of Genesis-raises questions about the
Creator's trustworthiness.
Indeed, the gap in knowledge,
freedom, and power; the fact of a prohibition; and the community
of subjects together seem sufficient to raise yet another question,
the question that perhaps underlies this concern about God's
trustworthiness: Does God really care about the man and
woman?90
CONCLUSION

The first two chapters of Genesis tell a story of creation by
speech and the first prohibition. The purported ruler is the
creator, apparently all-powerful. The would-be-subjects owe that
ruler their very existence. Even so, the nature of speech,
knowledge, power, and the experience of being a subject all
suggest that law inherently asks for trust. Every law bears the
lawmakers request of the subject: Will you trust me?

8

Genesis 3:5.

* Genesis 2:17.
9

Genesis 3:15-19.

90These questions go to the heart of one of the most difficult questions of
theology, the question of theodicy: Why would a good God allow evil to exist?
Unsurprisingly, the first few chapters of Genesis have figured importantly into
Christian responses to this question, as theologians have attempted to square the
Genesis story with the claims of Jesus and his followers. For a history of the
Christian doctrine of Creation, see generally COLIN E. GUNTON, THE TRIUNE
CREATOR (1998).
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